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.. profound as p~ychology is, 
it\ a knife that cuts both ways." 
-Council for the Defence in 
The Brothers Karamazov 
Before I come to explain what some of the consequences of fiction as 
polyphony are, let me say, by way of introduction, that our problem in a 
nutshell involves the symbolic and what we understand by this term. In 
particular, things in this regard could be said to turn around what is 
still, to my mind, a perennial problem in literary criticism, namely, an 
author's relationship to what he/she writes. Perhaps it is hardly 
necessary to repeat that, here, it is a question of life <~nd death: the 
'Death of the author' whose absence takes on a kind of 'presence' (= 
life) in the text - a 'resurrection accomplished in signs' , as Julia 
Kristeva has called it. (Kristeva, 1981;181) In a sense, therefore, those who 
used to maintain (and often still do- if only by implication) that a dash 
of psychology was sufficient to provide literary interpretation with 
illumination, may in fact have given us a clue as to how the literary 
critic might get onto the right track in this matter. For psychology, as 
our epigraph has it, 'is a knife that cuts both ways' (Dostoevsky, 
1976;690); it oscillates between the notion of truth as referential and 
fiction (we will return to this point). 
Thus when 'Madam Bovary, c'est moi' began to reverberate around 
the psychologist's camp- when Flaubert himself was there deemed to 
be the leading protagonist of his fiction, one could have done worse, in 
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my view, than reply: 'Ah yes, that's Flaubert there all right, but 
masked, displaced, as the name itself in his text- as woman. in short, 
in the place of the symbolic (Other).' 
joyce would feature similarly in Finnegans Wake (1939): or rather the 
name, 'Joyce', would feature in this 'sinscript' (FW 421) of a 
'rneanderthalltale' (FW 25) (=fiction). Thus if 'Shem is as short for 
shemus asJem is joky for Jacob' (FW 169) there is Joyce himself. to be 
sure, in his text- give or take- or change- a letter or two- or is it a 
litter or two? For those who doubt it, how about: 'Shem the penman' 
(FW 125) or 'Pain the Shamman'? (FW 192) or 'Shun the Punman'? 
(FW 93) 'joynstone'? (FW 192) or simply, 'Mr jingleyoys'? (FW 466). 
The point is that if these names and punning phrases evoke the name. 
'James Joyce' , through 'echo' and/or association, this echo - or 
metonymy- also blurs the presence of the name in the text, makes it a 
little uncertain and problematic, opens up the way to interpretation(s). 
This echo, clearly, is thus the basis of a seduction of the reader. 
Previously, criticism ignored the problematic aspect of displacement 
and preferred instead to jump to conclusions- as is evidenced by the 
case of Flaubert. It is this problematic aspect, however, which is also the 
poetic, or written' , aspect of the text. I am saying, then, that for the 
writer to be in the text symbolically, is to 'be' in it problematically. 
Such would be the context, then, whereby the writer produces the 
position of writer- which is, at the same time, the 'place' of writing as 
writing. To put it another way: the writer's position is equivalent to the 
'enactment' of textuality, or the mise en scene of the enonciation . 
.lean-Louis Houdebine thus writes with regard to Molly's monologue in 
Ulysses, that: 
... the importance of Penelope is of the order of the written (ecrit); 
and this writing (ecrit) is not interpretable only from the point of 
view of the avatars of the fable, that is, of the characters "with a 
human face". It is a writing (ecrit), then, which stages (met en 
scene) an enonciation of woman entirely constructed from the 
outside (de I'interieur), not a woman as character ... (Houdebine, 
1981 ;60). 
And Houdebine adds in a note that nowhere in the Penelope episode is 
Molly objectivated as a 'character' :"it is a voice which is speaking, and 
through its speaking (parole) the contours of the body are designated, 
not the reverse' (Houdebine, 1981; note 58).' 
With respect to this writing as enonciation, the writer is no longer in 
the position of 'self' ( = ego) on the one side and the text as object on the 
other- as was the case, or would be the case, for a certain psychology 
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(more aptly named, 'ego psychology'). Rather, the writer occupies the 
place of the symbolic itself- this symbolic order which is the condition 
of possibility of language as such. In other words, the writer of fiction 
brings the possibility of a metalanguage into question: something is 
written which is inseparable from the (poetic) signs of writing as 
writing; something which is inseparable from the signs that tell us that 
the 'saying' as such is part of the meaning; what is said includes the 
saying - as is illustrated by Molly's poetic 'yes' in the following 
passage: 
... I asked him with my eyes to ask again yes and then he asked me 
would I yes to say yes my mountain flower and first I put my arms 
around him and drew him down to me so he could feel my breasts 
all perfume yes and his heart was going like mad and yes I said yes 
I will Yes Ooyce, 1968;704). 
The interesting, and disturbing, thing to my mind is that in fact the 
writer's position is the position of all of us in so far as we are speaking 
beings and traversed by the symbolic. 
The symbolic for us, as users of language, as beings constituted in and 
through language, implies that there is no outside of language. There is 
no outside of language- it is essentially fictional (Barthes)- and yet it 
is by no means the case that, after all, we have been speaking poetically 
all our lives rather than prosaically; we would thus be hard-pressed to 
show any real advance on M. Jourdain! What is even more remarkable 
here, is that language itself constitutes its own 'outside'; language 
produces a meta-linguistic position, as it were, to which we are all 
committed -despite ourselves. Psychoanalysis has tried to explain this 
division between the two levels of language by a theory of repression. 
The concept of repression in this context has less to do with the loss of 
knowledge of a specific event, than it has to do with the 'wall' of 
incommunicability (Kristeva, 1981;172) between, let us say, the 'poetic' 
and the 'prosaic' self- the two dimensions being what constitutes the 
subject. The poetic self is still speaking through the prosaic self, but is 
unable to communicate with it without recourse to a third position ( = 
analyst, or writer). This is what Freud terms the split (Spaltung) of 
subjectivity. 
The artist as writer, like the analyst perhaps, is interested in 
depicting both aspects of subjectivity, of placing both aspects before an 
audience. This poetry, however, is not necessarily the voice of his own 
unconscious (although that may be there also); rather, it is equivalent to 
the 'placing'· itself - the placing of the prosaic on stage so that we 
experience not only what is said, but the 'saying' as well. Or to cite 
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Finnegans Wake again (yes, 'Finn again'!), there is 'sensesound' as 
well as 'soundsense' (FW 121). The writer as artist- if one is joyce, 
Mallarme, or, as we shall see, Dostoevsky (the rest is journalism')- is 
interested in signifying this division of subjectivity: a division to which 
it is essentially impossible to gain access other than aesthetically- that 
is, fictively. 
Such a trajectory opens up an extremely complex domain regarding 
the relationship, not only between the writer and the text, but also 
between language and ideology - whether one defines the latter in 
terms of 'doctrine', 'Weltanschauung' or, like the French historian, 
Paul Veyne, as a 'noble and vague style' (rationalisation) which passes 
itself off as rigorous description (1978;213). It seems to me, however, 
that if we side-step the complexity for a moment, a joyce, a Dostoevsky, 
and even a Celine - as artists - tend to make the concept of ideology a 
redundant calegory when it comes to analysing the bases of their work. 
This is underlined if we add that an ideology functions successfully only 
if what opposes it is reduced to silence, or even excluded altogether from 
the domain of discourse. Ideology then, is, in principle, homogeneous 
and excludes 'otherness' . To use Bakhtin's terms, ideology is 'mono-
logical' rather than 'dialogical' (Bakhtin, 1973;150-226). The ideologue, 
indeed, speaks only from one position- and this implies that the fictive 
yuality of discourse is denied. As a result, we will argue that it is a 
'heterogeneity of place' (Lacan) which characterises the work of the 
writer as artist. As I see it, the debate about ideology risks becoming 
sterile so much is it concerned with the extent to which consciousness 
is, or is not, an adequate explanation of human action. I would say 
further, with Paul Veyne, that 'to judge people by their acts [in which I 
would include 'speech acts' [ is not to judge them by their ideologies' 
(1978;211). On this basis, therefore, if we are concerned to show that 
writing itself is essentially an act, it remains to be shown how the notion 
of ideology can provide any illumination here. In any event, I leave it to 
others to enter into the vicious circle of ideology if they wish.3 For 
my own part, I would like to turn instead to Dostoevsky, and in 
particular to The Brothers Karamazov, in order to show how Dostoevsky, 
as writer, is both 'actor and impresario' in relation to what he writes 
(d. Kristeva 1981 ;165). 
Bakhtin's work, as more and more people are aware, has shown that 
Dostoevsky's major novels have a 'polyphonic' structure. This means 
that rather than presenting another more or less transparent version of 
the self, the texts in question have the structure of the T in series, 
where each T represents a relatively autonomous centre of enunciation. 
The monologic novel, let us note, tends to have a single centre of 
enunciation. Not a reflection of the persona of the one who writes, then, 
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but an entirely 'other' subject is what is presented. Thus Bakhtin 
remarks that: 
For the author the hero is not 'he' and not T, but a full valued 
'thou', that is another full-fledged 'I' ('Thou art'). (Bakhtin, 
1973; 51) 
Such is the basis of the de-centred structure of polyphony which makes 
works like The Brothers Karamazov or The Devils dialogical rather than 
monological texts. 
This 'I' in series corresponds to the mise en sc~ne of the enonciation: it 
is a kind of dramatisation of voice(s). To achieve this effect, the writer 
must 'distance' himself from each of his creations while remaining 
intimately involved with them and fundamentally interested in the 
process of their becoming written bodies. This is to say that the 
artist/writer throws himself into the void, deals exclusively with the 
Other as the place of signification and thus of the enonciation. A 
heterogeneous place, quite obviously. Or, more theologically, the word 
is with the writer; the writer is (in the place of) the word. Kristeva 
describes this situation in these terms: 
[Dostoevsky] does more and does better than his characters: he 
speaks from their place like them but in addition, he sees them 
from a distance and puts them on stage; he is himself Father and 
his own Son. (Kristeva, 1981;180). 
'Polyphony', therefore, also means 'heterogeneity of place' with the 
writer coming to assume the 'non-place' of the mise en scene as such. 
The writer is 'between the lines', as it were, dis-placed. 
With a text like The Brothers Karamazov, however, it seems to me 
than one can go further in justifying this conception of writing as a mise 
en scene by referring to certain events that are recounted in the novel. 
Indeed, like Freud before us, how could we fail to be enticed to reflect on 
what is recounted- and the writer's place in the relation to this- when 
we are confronted with the death of a father: Fyodor Pavlovich 
Karamazov? 
In this regard, it is to be noted that not only is 'Fyodor' also 
Dostoevsky's christian name· which the translator, Ralph Matlaw tells 
us is equivalent to 'Theodor' in English, and means 'gift of God' (Matlaw 
in Dostoevsky; 743) - but also, the personage whom the narrator 
designates as the hero of the novel, Alyosha, bears the name of 
Dostoevsky's dead son. Father and son appear - but only through 
displacement-in the text. Thus, the idea that Dostoevsky is the father 
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in the novel should be tempered by the qualification that it is through 
the name- and thus, symbolically- that Dostoevsky comes to occupy the 
place of the dead father - precisely the position of every writer in 
relation to his own creation. It is the place indeed of the dead father 
which, from the perspective of psychoanalysis, constitutes the place of 
the Other and language as such.lt is an absence (that is to say, death), 
therefore, which we will say is at the 'origin' of Dostoevsky's text. The 
fictionalised death, then, is what gives the text in question its fecundity_ 
Hence it is within such a context that I would place Dostoevsky's 
announcement in The Notebooks that: 'We are all, to the last man, 
Fyodor Pavloviches' (Dostoevsky; 769). 
To press the psychoanalytic aspect still further, let us note that J_ 
La can has defined the general parameters of the con text with which we 
are dealing here, when he says that paternity is 'trans biological' (Lacan, 
1973; 224) and that it is this which is originally repressed. The question 
is: how is this trans biological phenomenon thinkable?- how is the truth 
of the father representable? 
This is only thinkable [says Lacan] via this a-historical drama 
inscribed in the very flesh of men at the origin of all history- death, 
the murder of the father. A myth, quite clearly, a very mysterious 
myth--- (Lacan, 1981, 244) 
And further: 
What is at issue is an essential dramatisation [my emphasis] 
through which an internal surpassing (un depassement interieur) 
enters the life of a human being- the symbol of the father. (244) 
It is necessary to interpret this remark_ The 'symbol of the father' 
functions as a principle of unity for the narcissistically constituted ego. 
In other words, the Father occupies the place of the object or model 
which forms the basis of an imaginary identification which makes the 
Father the symbol of identity as such. This is why, according to Lacan, 
both sexes initially tend to identify with the Father (198). In addition, 
however, it is the place of the Father as the place of naming- and in 
particular, the proper name- which allows us to say that the symbol of 
unity is contained in the Name-of-the-Father. Consequently, it is the 
latter term which encapsulates the three aspects with which we are 
concerned: the concept of identity, the notion that identity is first of all a 
principle of unity and that, nonetheless, identity is essentially symbolic. 
An identity, then, hovers on the border between unity and fragmenta-
tion. And this is experienced by the ego as a veritable struggle between 
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being and non-being. The fact, for instance, that a proper name is a 
symbolic anchorage means that it is susceptible to dis-placement; that 
one can make a pun out of it as Joyce does - or, indeed, as Fyodor 
Pavlovich does when he relates the anecdote at the monastery (33) about 
the time he went to a small town on business and asked the captain of 
police, 'Mr Ispravnik' (An ispravnik is a captain of police, Ralph Matlaw 
tells us in a note) (see note 3) if he would be his 'Napravnik'- this being 
the name of a well known orchestra conductor. 'The pun is elaborate' 
Matlaw explains, 'because the conductor's name actually suggests 
''conductor'' or "directo~ while ispravnik suggest "rectifier'' or ~correc­
tor''_' (Bk 2, Ch. 11;33).Not surprisingly, perhaps, the captain was not 
amused and the business deal fell through. It is this imaginary identity 
of the ego constituted symbolically that the writer can thus exploit -
sometimes exhorbitantly - for his own artistic ends. He thereby 
profanes this sacred Name-of-the-Father in a gale of laughter and 
prefers to make the collapse of unity itself the source of his 'identity' in 
art. The problem that we must now examine, therefore, is that of how 
Dostoevsky will forge a unity out of this veritable heterogeneity of place 
which is his as artist. For to be sure, an absolute heterogeneity is chaos. 
The writer must make art out of this chaos. 
On the basis of the above remarks, I contend that the polyphonic 
structure of The Brothers Karamazov can be seen to be entwined with 
what normally passes for the essential theme of the novel- namely, 
parricide: the murder of Fyodat'\ the trial of his son Dimitry, and the 
events surrounding it. 
Each main event, or more exactly, each major situation, becomes the 
pretext for a relatively long discourse. The most famous of these would 
no doubt be Ivan Karamazov's 'poem', 'The Legend of the Grand 
Inquisitor' (Bk 5: Ch. V) - Ivan, let us recall, being the one who had 
convinced both churchmen and atheists alike that he was on their side 
with his 'strange article' on the widely debated question of ecclesiastical 
courts. (Bk 1, Ch III, 11~ A summary sketch of this polyphony of 
discourses which constitutes Dostoevsky's novel would include: Dimitry's 
'confessions' of love for Katerina (3:III-V); the elder Father Zosima's 
long oration about his past (6:II) which some would say is the 
counterpart to Ivan's poen; Ivan's three interviews (ll:VI-VIII)- just 
prior to Dimitry's trial- with Smerdyakov (the bastard son of Fyodor 
- as gossip would have it) who finally confesses to the murder of 
Fyodor; Ivan's dream dialogue (or is it a monologue?) with the devil 
(ll:IX) immediately following Smerdyakov's confession; and of course, 
there are the long speeches for the prosecution and the defence at 
Dimitry's trial (12:XI-XIII) in which a continual oscillation between 
guilt and innocence - marked by the reactions of the audience in the 
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court room- is set in motion. Dimitry who is innocent in a legal sense, 
is found guilty. This verdict corresponds to the feelings of guilt 
experienced by Dimitry. In effect, Dimitry hovers between guilt and 
innocence; or rather, his willingness to assume the position of the guilty 
party gives him an air of innocence. 
In this way, the trial itself becomes illustrative of an important 
rhetorical figure which is at the heart of the polyphonic structure of the 
text, namely, oxymoron, which Bakhtin suggests is, in its turn, one of 
the features of the discursive figure of 'menippea'. Menippea, which 
borders on the carnivalesque, has no fear of depicting 'scandalous' and 
eccentric behaviour in its scenes, of employing 'incongruous speeches 
and performance' (Bakhtin; 96) and of generally violating the 'accepted, 
ordinary course of events and ... established norms'. (96) In sum, 
Bakhtin argues that 'The menippea contains many sharp contrasts and 
oxymoronic combinations' (97). 
Thus oppositions such as love and hate, faith and atheism, sacred and 
profane, etc., depend on each other, threaten to merge into one another: 
'Love', says Bakhtin, 'lives on the border of hate which it knows and 
understands, and hate lives on the border of love, and also understands 
it• (148) ·which evokes Dimitry's cry to Katerina that he loved her even 
while he hated her (Bk 12, V; 655). Similarly, 'faith lives on the very 
border of atheism, sees its reflection in atheism and understands it, and 
atheism lives on the border of faith and understands it' (Bakhtin; 148), 
and so on. 
Exemplary as the above oppositions are however, they are a 
manifestation- through displacement- of that opposition which is at 
the heart of repression: namely, the opposition between the real and the 
symbolic. Specific oppositions only function as displacements of this 
fundamental one not only because the latter shows that what constitutes 
the real for consciousness (=ego) is animated by the symbolic, but also 
because this fact, in its turn, risks producing a valorisation of 
contradiction and, consequently, the subversion of every particular 
position. Quite clearly, this is what no body can accept. No body can 
accept that the sacred is merely a disguised version of the profane, that 
the devil is really in God's service. The scandal of the Grand Inquisitor 
is to be found precisely there. Here, then, in a nutshell, is the scandal of 
scandals- the unacceptable par excellence: the absolute dissolution of 
the Name-of-the-Father. Indeed, the sacredness of the Name-of-the-
Father derives from the effort of keeping this scandal at bay- a scandal 
which is also equivalent to the 'chaos' of the void. 
Let us now examine the death of Fyodor Pavlovich in this light of 
scandal- 'Fyodor' whose name has already alerted us to the symbolic 
investment that Dostoevsky has placed in this father's name. Let us 
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recall first of all that Fyodor, the father, is both an object of contempt 
and a 'buffoon' who makes puns out of people's names; but above all, we 
should bear in mind that Fyodor is a liar; he even admits to have been 
lying all his life: 
... I have been lying, lying positively my whole life long, every day 
and hour of it. Of a truth, I am a lie, and the father of lies. Though I 
believe I am not the father of lies. I am getting mixed in my texts. 
Say the son of lies, and that will be enough. (Bk 2, Ch. II, 37) 
In echoing John 8:44- and thus in parodying the Bible (=sacred text)-, 
in being a liar and a buffoon, the ambiguity of Fyodor the father's 
position is revealed. This is a father, furthermore, who abandoned his 
first child, Dimitry, upon the suicide of his first wife as he did his two 
children from his second marriage, Ivan and Alyosha, following the 
mental collapse and subsequent death of his second wife. Sophia. Here, 
then, is a father who refuses to be one, who is his own son's rival in love 
and yet still claims the right to be respected by his children; here is a liar 
who acknowledges his moral weakness only in order to lie all the more 
successfully; an 'inveterate buffoon' who freely admits there is a devil 
within him (if 'only a little one') but only in order to ingratiate himself 
with the devout elders at the monastery whom he thinks it worthwhile 
to cultivate. Even when making such a 'confession', the text tells us, 'It 
was difficult to decide .. whether he was joking or really moved'(36). 
Here, finally, is a man, therefore, who openly profanes the Name-of-the-
Father. Parricide will hardly be a bolt from the blue, it could be said. 
However, it is within the ambit of the profanity we have designated 
that the scandal of Fyodor's death will arise and not simply in the 
scandal generated by a son killing his father (which is to understand 
'scandal' precisely in the sense in which the crowd at Dimitry's trial 
understands this term). In other words, the profound scandal of 
parricide would consist in the lifting of the veil of repression. Parricide 
shows that sexuality (kinship) is a product of the symbolic, an effect of 
language'4 ; it shows that the 'sacredness of the father is invested in 
an ordinary man, that the sacred is in the profane and certainly knows 
and understands it. Through oxymoron, we can thus speak about the 
'sacredness' of the profane and the 'profanity' of the sacred. Furthermore, 
this scandal which echoes the 'scandal of scandals' - and which is 
constitutive of Dimitry's impossible status as criminal and innocent 
victim- is established through the 'two-edged weapon' of psychology. 
Dimitry is condemned by psychology which, as Fetyukavich the 
defence council says, exists on the border of fiction. Here, psychology is, 
in the end, dependent on circumstantial evidence5 - clouded in an 
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atmosphere of gossip: it is said that Dimitry talked loudly in taverns 
about murdering his father, etc." Much is indeed confused in the babble 
of gossip (cf. Joyce). And yet Dimitry is found guilty- even though there 
were no witnesses to the crime. 'For is it likely', the psychologist says 
'that a man like that I that is, a Karamazov) who had the opportunity to 
murder the father he hated, would not take it?' The answer for the 
psychologist is a clear negative. For a Karamazov does not think, like 
Hamlet, of the consequences; he does not give a thought to 'what lies 
beyond': 
I don't know (says the prosecutor-psychologist) whether Kara-
mazov wondered at that moment 'What lies beyond' and whether 
a Karamazov could like Hamlet, wonder 'What lies beyond'. No, 
gentlemen of the jury, they have their Hamlets, but we, so far, 
have only our Karamazovs' (Bk 12, Ch. IX, p. 680) 
The Karamazov nature, as the prosecutor had earlier affirmed, is 
typically Russian (d. Bk 12, Ch. VI; 663 and 665), a product of the 'norm' 
which Gerard Genette indicated is at the basis of verisimilitude 
(Genette, 1969; 74-75). 
The psychologist, then, is the one who deals with the 'typical' case, 
the 'normal' case- the one for whom the sacred is sacred and evil, evil; 
the one for whom the other is not 'difference' but another version of self: 
an alter-ego which, to be sure, is not recognised as such. If the 
psychologist had an intimation of difference, he would be an artist and 
not a prosecutor. In effect, the psychologists's fiction passes for truth 
until it is put on stage by the artist. In this context, Dimitry's defence 
council seems to touch- albeit, indirectly- on the writer's position by 
drawing attention to the fictionalising impulse of psychology - an 
impulse into which it has no insight. Thus Fetyukavich observes 
ironically that having heard in the 'highly talented prosecutor's speech 
a stern analysis of the defendant's character and conduct (Bk 12, Ch. X; 
690), it is to be noted that the prosecutor 
went into psychological su bleties in order to explain the essence of 
the matter to us, into which he could not have entered, if he had 
the least conscious and malicious prejudice against the defendant. 
But there are things which are even worse, even more fatal in 
such cases,than the most malicious and consciously unfair 
attitude. It is worse if we are carried away by a certain artistic 
creation, so to speak, the composition of a novel, especially if God 
has endowed us with psychological insight. (Bk 12, Ch.X, 680) 
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Fetyukavich contends, in sum, that psychology is 'a knife which cuts 
both ways': it can be used to support the most varied interpretations of a 
specific set of actions. Thus, this 'double-edged', or even, 'oxymoronic' 
quality of psychology, along with the attendant possibility of a 
multiplicity of meanings, is what gives it its status as fiction, its 
tenuous link with the referent. Although this puts us onto the right 
track with regard to the writer's aims and concerns, it is important to 
see that Dostoevsky is not a psychologist - and thus a producer of 
fiction which has lost its grip on the referent - in this sense. For 
Dostoevsky is not simply a psychologist; rather, as polyphonist, he is 
this and an anti-psychologist as well. As a result, it is important to see 
fiction here as more than the emergence of imaginary creations which 
are passed off as real. On the contrary, Dostoevsky's text is concerned to 
depict the 'reality' of the illusion itself. But this can occur only if the 
place (usually occupied by the critic) from which a judgement is 
habitually made about where reality ends and illusion begins, is 
dissolved - that is, becomes part of what is depicted. The writer is 
saying that the world is polyphonic - that the world is the 'saying' 
itself. I would suggest, therefore, that Fyodor Pavlovich's death is 
brought about by the fact that he occupies the ambiguous and untenable 
position of liar and buffoon. Indeed, the hatred for Fyodor resulting in 
his murder, is the outcome of the dissolution of the Name-of-the-Father, 
of the position of unity. Fyodor thereby gives us an intuition of the chaos 
of the world which is only bearable in two ways: either through a 
fantasy of unity characteristic of narcissism, or through the artistic 
effort to portray this chaos in a way which is equivalent to chaos 
becoming art through polyphony. 
The Grand Inquisitor, too, I would further contend, is another version 
of the dissolution of the Name-of-the-Father. For the Inquisitor is 
another whose status is supremely ambiguous, whose 'position' is 
founded on a deception. 
Indeed, the idea that the Inquisitor has a position (a love of humanity 
and a strategy for helping this humanity attain its 'worldly bread' of 
happiness) must be tempered by the fact that it is a deception which 
constitutes the basis of the Inquisitor's 'identity'. For the Inquisitor 
straddles the worlds of both Christ and the devil;7 he loves the people and 
at the same time the manifestation of this love is impossible without the 
underlying contempt for them mirrored in a disrespect for truth in their 
presence. To do Christ's work (the good) entails being in league with the 
devil (=evil) - but with the absolute proviso that this always remain a 
secret. The truth, therefore, is that the Inquisitor only pretends to work 
in Christ's name. 
The radically unorthodox character of the Grand Inquisitor's discourse 
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in which Christ becomes the accused, endows it with an air of menippea 
-orthodoxy here being nothing other than the clear separation of good 
and evil. Because Christ and the devil change places- so that now, it is 
the devil who has a profound concern for humanity (especially the weak) 
-the very intimate interdependence between good and evil, sacred and 
profane, truth and lie is thereby announced- that is, put on stage. The 
devil is shown to be the means whereby Christ might manifest his 
righteousness. Indeed, in order for Christ to resist the devil's tempta-
tion in the wilderness (the central issue of the Inquisitor's discourse), he 
had to be tempted in the first place. In this sense, the Legend of the 
Grand Inquisitor suggests that Christ and the devil know and understand 
one another - but only at the price of the Christ's position - as a 
position -being rendered profoundly unstable. To such an extent, 
perhaps, that 'unity' only exists here at the level of the discourse, or 
'poem', itself - a discourse which could be seen to include the 
continuing dialogue between Ivan and his brother Alyosha about faith 
and atheism. At the level of discourse, in effect, there is a kind of 
re-establishment of the Name-of-the-Father. 
Dostoevsky himself would be similarly 'saved' from the exhorbitant 
chaos that a heterogeneity of place implies. In other words, Dostoevsky's 
art is the unifying principle (the only unifying principle) which prevents 
a radically de-centred wor(l)d from resembling the world of psychosis. 
Dostoevsky is the principle of unity of his text, therefore, in the act of 
presenting diversity through the art of writing. It is this act of 
presentation which is fiction for the writer and at the same time the 
'centre of gravity' of his art. It is this act, indeed, which saves 
Dostoevsky's writing from resembling Ivan's devil who appears to him 
just prior to Dimitry's trial- a devil, we read, who is nothing but the 'xin 
an indeterminate equation'(Bkll, Ch.IX;609), 'a sort of phantom in life 
who has lost all beginning and end' (609) and who keeps us dangling 
between 'belief and disbelief by turns' (612). What kind of art is it, 
indeed, which could put this devil on stage? Nothing more fictional then 
than this 'place' of the writer. But nothing closer to being a 'gift of God' 
-'Fyodor'- either. 
Fiction and Polyphony 201 
FOOTNOTES 
1. Let us note here that from the feminine writer's posttiOn, 
Emily Bronte's Heathcliff in Wuthering Heights similarly 
marks out the writer's (displaced) position - and quite strikingly. 
For Catherine Earnshaw, it will be recalled, says: 'I am Heathcliff!' 
and she adds: 'He's always, always in my mind: not as a pleasure, 
any more than I am always a pleasure to myself, but as my own being' 
(Chapter 9). As Georges Bataille has shown in La Litterature 
et le mal (Paris, 1957)- albeit with a slightly different aim in view -it 
would be a mistake to see Heathcliff simply in the mode 
of Catherine's alter-ego. He is rather Catherine's radical Other who yet 
speaks through her - just as, no doubt, Emily Bronte speaks 
'through' both Catherine and Heathcliff by constituting them as two 
autonomous subjects, as voices which are speaking rather than an 
alter-ego. 
2. Veyne writes: "We are now beginning to understand what ideology is: a 
noble and vague style appropriate for idealising practices under the 
guise of describing them". 
3. It may be added that the whole of this paper implicitly takes issue 
with the notion that an explicitly fictive text can have direct political 
and/or moral effects - effects which some would argue 
are what ideology in literature is all about. Such a notion is at the heart 
of many a justification of censorship and certainly forms the 
basis of Rousseau's theory of the function of fiction from which many 
have yet to free themselves entirely. 
4. This expression is part of a remark by Phillippe Sollers to the 
effect that 'not only is there no natural sexuality, but that what 
one takes to be sex is only ever an effect of language' - ].L. 
Houdebine/P. Sollers, "La Trinite de Joyce" in Tel Quel, No. 83, 
Spring, 1980, p. 65. 
5. Fetyukavich points out, for example that: 
Now, thank God! we've come to the real point: 'since he 
was in the garden, he must have murdered him' [i.e. Fyodor 
Pavlovich]. In those few words: 'since he was, then he must' 
lies the whole case for the prosecution. (Bk 12, Ch. Xii, 
p. 698). 
6. Cf. the remarks of Fetyukavich again in ibid. 
7. Cf. the Grand Inquisitor's remark that, 'We are not working with 
Thee, but with him - that is our mystery. It's long - eight 
centuries- since we have been on his side and not on Thine' (Bk 
5, Ch. V, p. 238). 
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